Zijn theorie van algoritmische informatie, die volgens hemzelf teruggaat op de onterecht vergeten Leibniz,  leidt tot boeiende speculaties, namelijk dat het universum ultiem discreet is, meer nog, dat het bestaat uit 0 en 1 bits, uit digitale software. Je eigen computer lift met andere woorden gewoon mee op een universele computationele rit. God is dus geen wiskundige, ook geen DJ, maar een programmeur... Oh noes!

Lógica e linguagem

por OSWALDO CHATEAUBRIAND

A lógica se apresenta na prática contemporânea como uma multiplicidade de sistemas formais conceitualizados lingüística e matematicamente. Uma lógica (e, de modo mais geral, um sistema formal) é concebida como uma linguagem composta de uma sintaxe e de uma semântica. A sintaxe inclui tudo o que pode ser tratado como uma combinatória de símbolos, sem considerar quaisquer conteúdos que esses símbolos possam ter - isto é, sem considerar o que os símbolos simbolizam.

A formulação da linguagem (a gramática) é um aspecto central da sintaxe, mas esta não se restringe à gramática. Também a prova é tratada sintaticamente como constituída de operações (isto é, regras de inferência) realizadas sobre seqüências de símbolos de certas categorias como fórmulas e sentenças. Considerando uma totalidade de aplicações dessas operações pode-se definir as noções de dedução lógica, consistência lógica e teorema lógico, que juntamente com certas noções de definição (definição abreviativa, definição recursiva), são as principais noções sintáticas da lógica.

A semântica de uma linguagem lógica é baseada na noção de interpretação (ou de estrutura). Esta é uma noção que pertence principalmente à teoria de conjuntos e que envolve um universo de discurso - um conjunto não vazio - e uma função de denotação que atribui a vários símbolos denotações relativas ao universo de discurso. Pode-se, assim, introduzir as noções de satisfação e verdade relativas a uma interpretação. Considerando uma totalidade de interpretações, pode-se definir as noções de conseqüência lógica, satisfatibilidade e verdade lógica, bem como uma noção semântica de definição como individuação, que são as principais noções semânticas da lógica.

O estudo sistemático dessas noções e de suas interconexões pertence à teoria da prova, à teoria de modelos e à teoria da recursão, que são as áreas centrais da lógica e são basicamente ramos da matemática. A lógica enquanto ciência é considerada a combinação destas teorias, e não simplesmente lógica proposicional e lógica de predicados. Essa foi uma mudança importante na concepção de lógica. Para Frege e para Russell, por exemplo, a lógica se restringia à lógica proposicional e à lógica de predicados; e era uma ciência.

TEORIA DE CONJUNTOS - Apesar de se poder dizer com uma certa justiça que o desenvolvimento matemático da lógica foi iniciado por Aristóteles, o projeto moderno de uma algebraização da lógica tem sua origem em Leibniz. A característica universal de Leibniz pretendia ser uma linguagem para o pensamento puro combinando uma teoria de conceitos aritmetizada com um cálculo dedutivo algébrico contendo os princípios fundamentais de todas as ciências.

A idéia de Leibniz de um cálculo lógico algébrico se realizou no século XIX, principalmente por meio da obra de Boole, cujo The Mathematical Analysis of Logic estabeleceu a base para um tratamento algébrico sistemático da lógica seguindo a linha vislumbrada por Leibniz. No entanto, foi Frege em Begriffsschrift - e depois em Grundgesetze der Arithmetik - quem pela primeira vez axiomatizou e formalizou a lógica essencialmente na sua forma moderna. Essas axiomatizações e formalizações foram muito férteis e ainda são a base da teoria e da prática lógicas contemporâneas. Frege formulou sua lógica como uma “notação conceitual” (Begriffsschrift), e, seguindo Leibniz, se referiu a ela como uma “linguagem de fórmulas” e como uma “linguagem para o pensamento puro”, mas ele não a concebeu como uma sintaxe não interpretada. A sua lógica era uma teoria específica com conteúdo e escopo bem definidos, não deixando espaço para interpretação no sentido semântico usual.

Um fator significativo no desenvolvimento da atual concepção lingüística da lógica foi a descoberta dos paradoxos da lógica e da teoria de conjuntos, que pareceram minar os elementos platônicos na concepção de lógica e de teoria de conjuntos que encontramos em Frege e em Cantor. Foi em parte como reação aos paradoxos que Hilbert enfatizou os traços sintáticos da lógica, embora ele próprio não considerasse a sintaxe lógica realmente como sendo não interpretada. Ela é um “jogo de fórmulas”, mas um jogo de fórmulas que expressa as leis do pensamento refletidas na linguagem.

O formalismo de Hilbert e sua consolidação como filosofia da matemática teve uma influência importante no desenvolvimento inicial da concepção lingüística da lógica. Um fator relevante na transformação posterior da concepção de Hilbert em um tratamento mais literal da lógica como uma teoria de linguagens formais, foi a ênfase na lógica de primeira ordem e as conclusões relativistas que Skolem derivou do teorema de Lowenheim-Skolem.

As principais influências filosóficas na formação da concepção lingüística moderna de lógica foram Wittgenstein e os positivistas lógicos, embora também Russell tenha desempenhado um papel decisivo. A sua teoria eliminativista de classes, baseada na sua teoria eliminativista das descrições definidas, e a sua tendência de falar em funções proposicionais como sentenças abertas, abriram espaço para a interpretação de Principia Mathematica como uma teoria nominalista da lógica e da matemática que elimina os conteúdos abstratos dessas ciências em termos lingüísticos.

SINTAXE E SEMÂNTICA - Mas foi o trabalho de Tarski sobre a verdade, e a sua concepção semântica da verdade, que conduziu à consolidação da concepção lingüística e matemática da lógica na sua forma atual. A teoria de modelos foi em grande parte uma criação de Tarski, e ela transformou completamente o caráter da lógica moderna. O relativismo filosófico de Skolem se tornou um relativismo matemático aparentemente sem comprometimentos filosóficos. E o formalismo de Hilbert, minado pelos teoremas de incompletude de Godel, se tornou uma teoria sintática relativista de sistemas formais. A concepção absolutista de lógica que se encontra em Frege, em Russell e até mesmo em Hilbert, deu lugar a uma concepção relativista de lógica centrada na teoria de modelos e na teoria da prova como teorias de sistemas formais.

Tarski mantinha que a semântica é uma parte da morfologia da linguagem e que a concepção semântica da verdade é neutra em relação a questões metafísicas. Isso tornou a sua obra aceitável para filósofos de convicções radicalmente diferentes, muitos dos quais rejeitam uma concepção ontológica da lógica. Foi a análise formal da verdade de Tarski que permitiu separar a linguagem de fórmulas de seu conteúdo, seja como for concebido, e que proporcionou uma certa autonomia à sintaxe. Pode-se considerar a sintaxe como não sendo interpretada porque ela é interpretada pela semântica.

Isso leva à idéia de que a sintaxe vem antes e que ela pode subsistir por si só como pura manipulação simbólica; que é o que quero dizer por autonomia. Também foi graças à obra de Tarski que o problema da verdade se tornou basicamente um problema relativo à classificação de sentenças, que se adequa muito bem à idéia de que uma tarefa central da lógica é a classificação de sentenças em verdades lógicas e outras. Isto é um aspecto importante da concepção lingüística da lógica, em qualquer de suas múltiplas formas, e é parte da concepção standard de lógica. Ela é compartilhada por Carnap e Quine, por exemplo, apesar das suas diferenças.

A concepção positivista básica era a de que é o significado dos termos lógicos que garante a verdade lógica. Verdades lógicas eram consideradas analíticas, e analiticidade era tomada como uma propriedade exclusivamente lingüística. Quine rejeita esse tipo de concepção lingüística da lógica e ataca Carnap por mantê-la, mas, apesar disso, ele considera a linguagem como sendo constitutiva da lógica. Segundo a sua concepção, a verdade lógica e a lógica dependem da gramática e da verdade e não do significado. Em parte, isso é um modo de evitar uma interpretação ontológica da lógica, pois Quine concorda com os positivistas lógicos que a idéia de que a lógica é uma ciência que formula leis muito gerais sobre a estrutura da realidade não faz sentido. Em parte, todavia, o apelo à gramática e à verdade é o modo de Quine evitar as noções de significado e analiticidade, e o que torna isso possível é a obra de Tarski sobre a verdade.

SATISFAÇÃO E VERDADE - Na concepção quineana de lógica a noção de significado desaparece e é substituída pelas noções de satisfação e verdade. Algumas interpretações da concepção semântica de verdade de Tarski a vêem como se ela reduzisse a verdade à denotação, que é como se define usualmente verdade em uma interpretação, mas isso não é exatamente o que o próprio Tarski faz. Em todo caso, o significado desaparece, e o conteúdo das noções lógicas precisa ser recuperado por meio da denotação ou por meio da gramática. Mesmo quando a verdade é analisada em termos de denotação, os símbolos lógicos tipicamente não denotam nada, e o seu conteúdo é explicado como sendo o papel que eles desempenham na verdade ou falsidade de sentenças - uma idéia que remonta a Russell em On Denoting. Isso nos deixa apenas com a gramática e a verdade, como é sugerido por Quine.

A animosidade de Quine para com o significado e noções afins não é compartilhada por outros filósofos que também subscrevem a alguma forma de concepção lingüística da lógica. Em particular, existe agora uma corrente importante de interpretação lingüística da lógica, associada principalmente com a teoria da prova e com a lógica intuicionista, que nega o papel central da verdade na lógica e propõe o retorno à noção de significado como básica. De acordo com esta concepção, o significado das constantes lógicas é derivado das nossas práticas dedutivas. Considera-se o significado em geral como sendo intrinsecamente conectado à prova.

Apesar de haver diferentes opiniões sobre a relação entre lógica, linguagem e matemática, a categorização das noções lógicas em termos de sintaxe e semântica e a concepção da lógica como linguagem, ou linguagens, é basicamente tomada como estabelecida. Independentemente da concordância sobre os detalhes de uma ou outra concepção, existe um consenso bastante geral de que a conceitualização da lógica como linguagem é a conceitualização correta.

Eu não nego que conceitos lingüísticos desempenharam um papel importante no desenvolvimento da lógica, mas na minha concepção o caráter fundamental da lógica é metafísico, e não lingüístico. Por um lado, eu a vejo como uma teoria ontológica que é parte de uma teoria sobre as características mais gerais e universais da realidade; do ser enquanto ser, como disse Aristóteles. Por outro lado, eu a vejo como uma teoria epistemológica que é parte de uma teoria geral do conhecimento. Grande parte do meu livro Logical Forms é dedicado ao desenvolvimento e defesa de tal concepção metafísica da lógica, que envolve também uma avaliação crítica das reivindicações e suposições básicas da concepção lingüística.

Fragonoix Willhem

O I-Ching é um método de representação e leitura do universo, baseado na divisão do uno em duas forças, opostas e de mesmo peso. Essa dicotomia pode ser observada nas estruturas naturais - conseqüentemente, nas representações que o homem faz destas - e também no universo dos conceitos, na divisão em preto/branco, feminino/masculino, terra/céu, fundo/figura, sendo representado, a um nível superior, por duas forças denominadas yin e iang.

Essas duas forças dinérgicas - representadas no I-Ching por uma linha dividida (yin) e uma indivisa (iang) --, quando somadas, ganham novas representações, diferentes e mais complexas. Esse conceito seria transformado, muito posteriormente, no sistema binário dos computadores com a utilização do 0 e do 1 como os dois elementos opostos, os elementos primordiais que, quando multiplicados, assumem diferentes concepções.

No I-Ching, as linhas formam oito tríades, que podem ser unidas no Pa Kwa, representando assim, as oito direções, ou seja, os pontos cardeais e colaterais da rosa-dos-ventos. Representam também conceitos como penetração, acolhimento, alegria serena, imbolidade, luz, perigo, permeação e movimento, entre outras analogias à fenômenos naturais, parentes, animais, partes do corpo, etc.

A soma das tríades resultam num quadro de 64 hexagramas, ganhando novos conceitos e representações. Esses hexagramas podem ser lidos de um modo racional, analisando as linhas à partir da divisão em tríades, combinando os conceitos somados. Pode-se observar com uma aproximação ainda maior os diferentes conceitos das linhas, que relativizam-se de acordo com a posição que aparecem no hexagrama. Contudo, a representação gráfica pode ser lida de um modo mais subjetivo, apenas com a observação do símbolo gráfico.

O uso do I-Ching como oráculo era feito pelos antigos chineses com cinquenta varetas. Curiosamente, uma era retirada no início, talvez representando a escolha do consulente (a teórica e invisivel sétima linha). Depois de devidamente manipuladas, em um processo lento e meditativo, os resultados eram somados através de dois valores: 2 e 3. As somas podem resultar os números 6, 7, 8 ou 9. Os números ímpares são linhas contínuas e, os pares, linhas divididas.O 6 e o 9, no entanto, são linhas flutuantes/móveis. Forma-se o hexagrama inicial e, em seguida, altera-se a polaridade das linhas móveis, gerando um hexagrama análogo.

O I-Ching foi estudado por Terence McKenna, como dito anteriormente neste mesmo blog. Jung, Leibniz e outros também criaram novas raízes para o I-Ching dentro da ciência. Um estudo mais recente relaciona o I-Ching com o DNA humano. As aplicações da noção e desenvolvimento do I-Ching podem ser vistas em diferentes áreas da expansão do conhecimento e da consciência humana.

Links relacionados:

Yijing Algebra
http://www.yijing.co.uk/

An Ancient and Occult Genetic Code
http://www.battleax.org/NATASHA/CODE01.HTM

Binary and Octal Numbers / Ba Gwa and Yi Jing Numbers
http://www.chinapage.com/classic/iching/binary.html 

This points to a startling conclution that time, considered on its own, or "from its own side" as the Tibetans are wont to saying, is nothing. Ultimately speaking there is no such thing as time in reality. As individual objects have already been found to be empty of their inherent characteristics, so is time. Nagarjuna's argument here is quite similar to that advanced by Leibniz in his characterization of time and space as being relational and dependent on things and events. For Leibniz time and space do not exist on their own, and here is one of the main differences between him and Newton. If time could be thought of as inherent existing, for example, as a "place" wherein events take place in such a way that one event can be classified as being earlier or later, then there must already be some coordinates by which these events could be so classified, for how else can we know which one is earlier or later? But if that is the case, then time itself must already have within it some means to measure the positions of the events. This, however, contradicts Newton's own assumption that time is shorn of any marks and is nothing more than something that flows absolutely.

This also seems to be Nagarjuna's point. Time, as does everything else that is conceptually constructed, depends for its very being on other things. Without the things that compose events, time is nothing at all, not, of course, in the Newtonian sense of time having nothing in it, but time itself is nothing. We have time because we do have things in it, and we have things in it (and space) because we already have the concept of time. Time, space and things and events are totally inseparable from one another.

If time is empty in this sense, then it does make sense ultimately to hold that there is the past, the present and the future. For all these are but relations within time. Moreover, the past, present and future derive their being from the relation to the consciousness of an individual. We feel that the time "right now" is the present because this is what we feel, this is what we are consciousness of at the moment, and of course we feel taht this "now" is forever moving. This is only a fact of our consciousness. Since all of us are moving inexorably toward that end, we have the sense of time as something ever moving onward and something that absolutely cannot be recalled or repeated. Once time is lost, it is lost forever.

However, a startling thing from the teaching of the Buddha is that that feeling that we all have is but an illusion. The relation between past, present and future holds only if there is a reference point, a point at which the present can be determined. If the present couldn't be determined, then both the past and the future would make no sense. The present can only be determined with reference to the self, or the thinking consciousness. One feels that the present is nothing but one's own present. But if we were to take a more general position and detach ourselves from our own individual mental continuum and our body, then the present does not have to be what we ordinarily take to be here and now, but could in fact be anywhere, that is, any time.

Perhaps this is what is meant when it is said that Buddhas and highly attained Bodhisattvas are above time. They are timeless, and once it is totally, fully absorbed in the mind of a being like you and me that time itself is empty in this sense, then it is possible that we can be timeless too.

Monads are the sources of any spontaneous action not explainable in mechanical terms. They constitute the unity of any individual. All monads are living mirrors representing the whole universe.

Fascinating stuff, and I think I'll venture a bit beyond old reliable (Wikipedia) and do some proper reading on Leibniz, monadism and perhaps even into the dispute between him and Newton over calculus... Who knew a delicious little kek could take me here?

This afternoon I passed up the newfangled Whipped Creams for the classic Leibniz, but now see they've been given a positive, if slightly guarded, review on A Nice Cup Of Tea And A Sit Down. It's a rare moment when I bypass the weird experiemental treat and opt for the tried and true. How boring is that? Heh, perhaps it was just a moment of unpredictability, I've surprised myself by being unadventurous.

Sin embargo, de acuerdo con los científicos Reginald Cahill y Christopher Klinger, de la Universidad Flinders de Adelaide, Australia, sostuvieron hace unos días que lejos de estar asociado con las mediciones cuánticas, este caos está en el corazón mismo de la realidad. "El azar genera todo, incluso crea la sensación del ’presente’, el cual está tan notablemente ausente de la física de hoy día.

Todo empezó en 1930, cuando el lógico austriaco, Kurt Gödel cimbró el mundo matemático con la publicación de su teorema de la incompletitud. Se aplica a los sistemas formales —conjunto de supuestos y enunciados que pueden ser deducidos a partir de esos supuestos por las reglas de la lógica. Gödel demostró que, para la mayoría de los conjuntos de axiomas o leyes, existen teoremas verdaderos que no pueden ser deducidos. En otras palabras, la mayoría de las verdades matemáticas, nunca podrán demostrarse; es imposible escribir una descripción matemática completa del universo de la cual puedan deducirse todas las verdades físicas.

Explorando más a fondo estos inquietantes enunciados, Gregory Chaitin, de la Fundación "Thomas J. Watson" de IBM, definió en 1980 las "verdades azarosas" o aleatorias como aquéllas que no pueden derivarse de axiomas o leyes de un sistema formal, y un vasto océano de ese tipo de "verdades" rodea la "isla" de los teoremas demostrables.

Pero para rastrear el origen de estas afirmaciones podríamos ir mucho más atrás que Gödel, hasta el matemático alemán Gottfried Leibniz, en el siglo XVII, quien declaró que la realidad estaba construida por unidades que él llamó mónadas, las cuales determinan su existencia únicamente a partir de sus relaciones entre ellas mismas. Este panorama fue relegado por la ciencia oficial durante siglos, porque era extremadamente difícil encajar estas nociones en un sistema de cálculo referido a la mecánica de Newton.

Pero hoy, como las mónadas de Leibniz, Cahill y Klinger acuñaron el concepto de "seudo-objetos", que no tienen existencia intrínseca, sino que son definidos sólo por la magnitud de la fuerza con que se conectan unos a otros, hasta que en última instancia desaparecen del modelo, comprobando la ecuación matriz de Paul Dirac, en 1932, sobre el comportamiento de los electrones, que terminó prediciendo la existencia de la anti-materia.

En la teoría cuántica, las propiedades de dos partículas pueden correlacionarse, incluso cuando están muy lejos una de otra, sin que incluso pueda pasar una señal entre ellas. "Esta fantasmal conectividad de amplio rango está aparentemente fuera del espacio", sostiene Cahill, pero en el modelo de la realidad que creó con Klinger, existen algunas conexiones que actúan como gusanos para conectar defectos topológicos distantes.

Aunque suena un poco complicado, estas teorías tienden a borrar lentamente las "viejas" ideas del siglo XX sobre la realidad y la materia. Las cosas no son lo que aparentan.

Cómputo cuántico, la paradoja de la antimateria

La física después de Einstein, se empieza a poblar mundos de especulaciones tras nuevos descubrimientos, sobre todo las realidades subatómicas. El universo del electrón, el fotón y sus contrapartes conocidas como antimateria, plantea toda una nueva rama del saber, casi inexplorada, la física cuántica que, si la ciencia continúa avanzando aceleradamente, promete a mediano plazo una nueva revolución tecnológica de insospechadas consecuencias.

Algunos de esos procesos atómicos se han documentado en experimentos recientes, como ese en el que se aisló un átomo, comprobándose que éste podía localizarse en dos lugares al mismo tiempo, comprobación que sería la primera demostración de la mecánica cuántica, que confirmaría el don de la ubicuidad de la materia. Erwin Schrödinger, considerado como el padre de la mecánica cuántica, imaginó un famoso experimento mental para cuestionar las interpretaciones de la nueva teoría: supongamos que se encierra a un gato en una caja, junto con un detector de radiación que puede accionar un mecanismo para destapar una botella con gas venenoso; se pone en la caja un átomo de alguna sustancia radiactiva para que, en el momento en que se produzca la emisión radiactiva, se desencadene el mecanismo que mata al gato. De acuerdo con la interpretación ortodoxa de la mecánica cuántica, mientras nadie observa lo que sucede dentro de la caja, el átomo está simultáneamente en dos estados -emitió y no emitió radiación- y, por tanto, el gato está vivo y muerto a la vez; sólo cuando se observa lo que sucede en la caja se define el destino del felino".

Científicos de la Universidad de Boulder, en Colorado, utilizaron un átomo ionizado de berilio en lugar de un gato, y en pocas palabras se comprobó una separación del átomo partido en 80 millonésimas de milímetro, distancia insignificante pero altamente significativa en las dimensiones atómicas.

Si estos principios se aplican a los conocimientos matemáticos de las ciencias del cómputo se trascendería uno de los umbrales de la realidad física que conocemos, y antes de entender cómo funciona, podría llevarnos a un salto cuántico en la tecnología de las computadoras. Las máquinas de cómputo de hoy en día se basa en bits, con la información codificada en circuitos electrónicos en una serie de unos y ceros. Pero en la medida en que los circuitos se miniaturizan cada vez más, la conmutación se acerca al nebuloso universo de la física cuántica. Los objetos cuánticos, como los electrones y otras partículas subatómicas pueden existir en estados alternos simultáneamente, en "1" ó "0". Pero esta propiedad, conocida como superposición, abre el camino a una aproximación enteramente nueva al cómputo, en la que un bit cuántico o qubit, permite manipular dos valores al mismo tiempo.

Una de las más importantes aplicaciones implícitas en este desarrollo es el manejo de números larguísimos, base del encriptación, ya que los números primos son el fundamento de la privacidad en las comunicaciones electrónicas. Otra aplicación más distante en el futuro sería la teleportación, es decir, la posibilidad de mantener dos objetos en estados (y, por tanto, distancias) simultáneas.

Peter Shor, eminencia en la materia de los laboratorios AT&T, dice que es posible construir una computadora de 30 quibits dentro de una década, lo cual sería sólo el comienzo de una tecnología que enlazaría cientos de miles de qubits para resolver problemas más allá de la capacidad de las computadoras clásicas.

Links recomendables: Ciencia Popular - Teoría cuántica Wikipedia – Definiciones Mind surf – Cuántica y filosofía

Após ler um pequeno resumo desta obra, interessei-me imediatamente. O resumo, falava-me então de uma crítica à sociedade da época e um ataque pessoal, disfarçado, a Leibniz. Adorando eu sátiras, o interesse aumentou bastante e foi-me impossível resistir à tentação de o ler. Entretanto, a crítica a Leibniz, por parte de Voltaire, é no mínimo soberba. Leibniz, acreditava, que tudo o que acontecia, era o melhor que poderia acontecer no melhor dos mundos. Voltaire, achava isso ridículo. Uma frase que estava no livro,  que eu não me esqueci, era mais ou menos nestes termos:

Como é que crianças inocentes poderão ter morrido, no terramoto de Lisboa e os maiores pecadores, bêbados, traiçoeiros, violentos homens vivem felizes em Londres ?

Ao longo da história, vão sucedendo as coisas mais improváveis a Cândido. É através desta série de azares, que Voltaire crítica Leibniz. Fazendo com que um livro inteiro, seja uma crítica contínua ao pobre alemão. Como anteriormente referi, a crítica à sociedade da época, é também de elevada qualidade. Através da qual, Voltaire, mostra a sua arte de bem ironizar em poucas palavras. Um livro aconselhadíssimo.

die Tiere aus dem Leibniz-Zoo.

Ja, eine herrlich alte Werbung (oder gibts die noch?). Wer es nicht kennt: Bahlsen (die mit den 52 Zähnen) haben für die kindliche Zielgruppe den Leibniz Zoo herausgebracht. Knabbergebäck in etwa 12 verschiedenen Tierformen; bei denen natürlich auch der Elefant nicht fehlen durfte. Die Verpackung sieht so aus:

Zusätzlich konnte man noch Plastikfiguren sammeln, womit ich beim eigentlich Zweck dieses Beitrages bin: der Elefanten-Plastik-Figur:

Ja... nicht gerade überragend, aber für den Anfang reichts. ;)

Die anderen 11 Tiere waren übrigens:

Strauß

Nilpferd

Bär

Löwe

Affe

Walroß

Kamel

Pinguin

Känguruh

Dinosaurier

Krokodil

But what would we make of Leibniz today? Would we admire his eclectic scholarship, or would we suspect him of dumbing everything down? Would we see him as the typical modularisation project, with all its benefits and risks?

Over recent years it has become much more acceptable in academic circles to pursue interdisciplinary studies and research, and we have come to understand that a good deal of progress for society is achieved not within disciplines, but between them. Whole new subject areas have developed out of this realisation, including biotechnology.

It is of course still true that scholars need to have a good grounding in the disciplines they wish to study. But we need to ensure that specialisation is achieved within a broader context, including an understanding of relevant knowledge from other areas; and not just adjacent areas, but from across the whole spectrum. For example, addressing questions of ethics is becoming increasingly important for leading scientists.

We could therefore do worse than looking again at some of the great polymaths of past ages, including Gottfried von Leibniz. After all, Leibniz has received the ultimate accolade: he has a biscuit named after him.

Kant Fundamento da Metafísica dos costumes, Crítica da Razão Prática

Tocqueville Da Democracia na América

Marx Manifesto do Partido Comunista, Manuscritos de 1844, Antologia do Capital

Hegel A Introdução à História da Filosofia, O Sistema da Vida Ética

Schopenhauer Mundo com Vontade de Representação

Nietzsche Assim Falava Zaratustra, Crepúsculo dos Ídolos, Ecce Homo

Husserl Meditações Cartesianas

Bergson As Duas Fontes da Moral e da Religião, A Evolução Criadora

• Os que já saíram e que, também, são de elevado valor:

Platão O Banquete, Fedro, Apologia de Sócrates

Aristóteles Política

Séneca (Os Estóicos), A Vida Feliz, Manual (Epicteto), Pensamentos (Marco Aurélio) (meu favorito)

Santo Agostinho Confissões

Maquiavel O Príncipe, A Arte da Guerra

Descartes Discurso do Método, Meditações Metafísicas

Pascal Pensamentos

Kierkegaard O Desespero Humano

Locke Dois Tratados do Governo Civil, Carta e Ensaio sobre a Tolerância

Leibniz Discurso da Metafísica, Monadologia

Voltaire Cândido ou o Optimismo, Tratado sobre a Tolerância

Hume Investigação sobre o Entendimento Humano, Diálogos sobre a Religião Natural

Confesso, que estava à espera de Sartre e de Rousseau. Fica para próxima. :)

+In legatura cu alegatiile privind constituirea „Fratiei Ortodoxe" la Cluj, rectorul UBB, Andrei Marga, precizeaza urmatoarele:

1. Nu am semnat nicio adeziune la astfel de initiative si nu am participat la nicio discutie in aceasta privinta. Nu am avut si nu am nicio legatura cu respectiva initiativa.

2. Sint dator sa precizez cel putin trei lucruri:

a) solutiile la problemele Romaniei nu se afla nicidecum in trecut;

b) abordarea problemelor religiei nu are alternativa la ecumenism;

c) imaginea asupra lui Iisus si asupra crestinismului este schimbata complet, gratie cercetarilor istorice, biblice, teologice din ultimele decenii, incit relatia dintre cultura si religie se pune in termeni complet noi in epoca de fata.

Andrei Marga+

Este de domeniul evidenţei faptul că trebuie recurs la un model occidental pentru transformarea culturii române. Acest model occidental adecvat nu poate fi iniţiat de Universitate, pentru moment  controlată  de internaţionalişti ce îşi arogă  agresiv rolul  managerial pentru cultura română. Acest model de ameliorare în  cultura română  poate fi iniţiat numai de Biserica Ortodoxă Română.  Însă care model occidental ni se potriveşte ? Dacă studiem istoria culturală a Occidentului în general, si istoria Bisericii Occidentale în particular, observăm că rolul liderului cultural novator în Occident îi revine Sfântului Anselme din Aosta (1033-1109), numit de asemenea Anselme de Cantorbéry. În anul 1060, Anselme din Aosta intra la mănăstirea benedictină din Bec, în Normandia. Acolo studiază cu atenţie şi diligenţă  doctrina teologică a Sfinţilor Părinţi ai Bisericii Orientale dimpreună cu Logica ! Mănăstirea benedictină era deja organizată după modelul oferit în scrierile călugărului scit Ioan Cassian. Sfântul Anselme,   născut din părinţi lombarzi (tatăl  era Gundulph, iar mama - Ermenberga),  va condensa pentru uzul occidentalilor cea mai clară sinteză a teologiei Părinţilor Bisericii Orientale din secolul IV.  ‘Softul’ anselmian,  extras din doctrina cappadocienilor, continuă în Europa Occidentală elanul de civilizaţie a excelenţei, elanul Romaniei Orientale din veacurile IV, V, VI.

Dar hai să vorbim acum numai despre importanţa argumentului ontologic al lui Anselme pentru  toată cultura Europei occidentale, pentru felul în care evoluează prin ceea ce numim ‚progres’ spre ‚modernitate’. De obicei argumentul ontologic al lui Anselme este formulat printr-o înşiruire de trei propoziţii : « Avem o idee despre Fiinţa  perfectă; perfecţiunea comportă existenţa ; deci Fiinţa  perfectă  există. » Totuşi,  dacă în argumentul ontologic al lui Anselme  este implicat ca un datum predefinit principiul logic al identităţii, atunci ultimele două propoziţii devin redundante. Principiul identităţii era cunoscut încă de pe vremea lui Aristotel. Cu acesta, argumentul ontologic al lui Anselme se reduce la o singură propoziţie : « Avem o idee despre Fiinţa  perfectă. ». Or, această idee vagă despre Fiinţa  perfectă  este numai caz particular de reprezentare ontologică. Şi, în general, argumentul lui Anselme este asigurat şi validat  prin orice reprezentare ontologică. Reductibil la o formulare mai inteligibilă, avem demonstrat faptul că Dumnezeu există prin  însuşi faptul că omul este capabil să construiască reprezentări ontologice. Dar, bineînţeles, mai este implicat aici, predefinit,  principiul scolastic enunţat de Sfîntul Anselme: „Fides quoerens intellectum.” - ‚Credinţa caută inteligenţa, eu nu caut să înţeleg pentru a crede, ci cred în Absolut şi astfel înţeleg’. Argumentul ontologic constituie nucleul ‚softului’ anselmian ce va permite europenilor occidentali să construiască reprezentări ontologice despre realitate. Aceste reprezentări ontologice constituie instrumentalitatea  raţională cu ajutorul căreia europenii occidentali vor descoperi şi cuceri lumea.

Ce înseamnă  sloganul despre  ‘Înnoirea Bisericii’ pe care îl tot auzim după  1989 ?  Înseamnă el cumva renunţarea la tradiţia isihastă? Căci insistăm, numai Biserica Ortodoxă Română  tradiţională  poate conduce procesele de transformare a României după un ‘soft’ anselmian care a dus la progres în Occidentul European. Pentru că ‘softul’ anselmian reprezenta cea mai condensată şi clară sinteză a teologiei Părinţilor Bisericii Orientale din secolul IV. Constantin Rădulescu- Motru, singurul creator de sistem filosofic  din cultura română  (Andrei Marga nu este, oricât ar impreca spre noi lăudătorii lui) intuia toate acestea într- o carte publicată  la 1904.  Într – adevăr, primul dintre cugetătorii români care dovedeşte intuiţia raţionalităţii  instrumentale pe linia scolastic– anselmiană a fost Constantin Rădulescu –Motru. Era nepotul acelui Eufrosin Poteca (1786 - 1859),  discipolul  ideologiei  Şcolii de la Sfântu Sava. Constantin Rădulescu –Motru a fost năpăstuit ulterior de comunişti, urgisit chiar şi acum de potera internaţionalistă din pricină că nu a fost „politiceşte corect”. Indicaţiile cominterniştilor care au luptat în Spania şi au dominat  politica românească neîntrerupt din 1945 şi până acum  l- au lăsat să moară de foame. Se spune chiar şi în prezent, fie direct,  fie indirect însă ameninţător la adresa potenţialelor dezvoltări independente şi pozitive  din cultura română, că  năpăstuitul Constantin Rădulescu- Motru şi- a meritat cumplita soartă! 

În lucrarea ‚Cultura română şi politicianismul’,  Constantin Rădulescu - Motru punea un accent extraordinar pe utilitatea  principiului identităţii, exact în sensul că reprezentarea ontologică în limba română este un construct necesar al realităţii pentru românii care doresc integrarea în societatea modernă. La Constantin Rădulescu – Motru, postulatul logic al  identităţii  ne dă adevărul. Filosoful român are totuşi certitudinea dificultăţilor   extraordinare pentru românii aflaţi în căutarea adevărului. De asemenea  filosoful posedă  certitudinea aproape mesianică a succesului nostru ca naţie : "Iubirea de adevăr... trebuie cucerită, prin forţele noastre proprii. Va veni şi vremea ei odată". Constantin Rădulescu – Motru rămâne pe linia abordării de tip anselmian în aceeaşi carte şi atunci când  leagă principiul identităţii  în logica sa, de ortodoxism scriind în mod expres :  "Biserica Ortodoxă a fost neclintit conducătoare sufletească a românilor." Dacă interpretăm şi  cele spuse de Constantin Rădulescu – Motru în cealaltă lucrare extrem de importantă, ‘Personalismul energetic’ – chiar şi din titlul cărţii se vede influenţa ideilor Sfântului Ierarh Vasile cel Mare--, putem afirma că dogma de sprijin a filosofiei lui este, la fel ca la Sfântul Anselme,  doctrina Sfintei Treimi a  Cappadocienilor Sfinţi Părinţi de Civilizaţie.

Anul 1648 marca pentru Europa nu doar sfârşitul "războiului de 30 de ani", ci şi începutul de epocă pe care Leibniz o caracteriza prin  asertarea ce- i părea mirobolantă lui Voltaire : "Trăim în cea mai bună dintre lumile posibile!". Leibniz  realizase o sinteză a filosofiei aristotelice cu filosofia carteziană, având natura unei teologii pozitive. Dar,  în alt chip, el mergea pe urmele părinţilor filosofi cappadocieni care incorporaseră  filosofia greacă într- o teologie nouă. Ştim că această sinteză a sfinţilor părinţi ai bisericii constituie unul dintre pilonii civilizaţiei create în Romania Orientală în secolele IV,  V, şi VI. Iar lucrarea  de cugetător  a lombardului Anselme, din veacul al XI-lea, asupra dogmei cappadociene a Sfintei Treimi fondează de facto Scolastica. Mulţi dintre noi nu înţelegem prea bine importanţa majoră a Scolasticii  pentru cultura lumii,  pentru descoperirea faţetelor sale,  datorită ideologiei ateiste ce ne -a spălat creierele (iar Andrei Marga a fost un asemenea ideolog comunist).

Titus Filipas

Siglo XVII. El filósofo y matemático Leibniz intenta justificar el mal en el mundo. Su sociedad se estaba derrumbando. La Verdad con mayúsculas deja de tener sentido mientras Leibniz se empeña en decir que ESTE es el mejor de los mundos, y que el mal del mundo es el menor posible. Estoy casi segura que sabía que estaba diciendo sandeces. ¿Qué coño de "mejor mundo posible"? ¿Acaso podemos elegir otro mundo? ¿No nos encontramos arrojados en esta tierra, nos guste o no? El mundo no es ni bueno, ni malo, ni es una tragedia ni un paraíso. No es nada en sí mismo. Leibniz era  un tío listo y eso seguro que lo sabía: que la vida no tiene ningún sentido. Pese a todo se puso a contar cuentos... "¿Y qué? ¿Y a mí que me importa? ¡Se lo doy yo! Le doy el sentido que me haga sentir más vivo, el que me permita pasar por esta tierra con la mayor intensidad posible" (esto lo dice mi Leibniz imaginado)

Y yo también declaro (me invento) con Leibniz que: ESTE ES EL MEJOR DE LOS MUNDOS POSIBLES.

Este blog nace fruto de una canción de Beirut. Una de las canciones más espíricas y positivas que he oído nunca. Cada vez que la escucho me dan ganas de saltar de mi cama al techo, de comerme un helado de chocolate, de bañarme desnuda en la piscina. Y sí, es sólo una canción... ¿Y QUÉ? Me ha alegrado la tarde y punto. No creo que la vida sea más que esas pequeñas cosas...

El optimismo como la mejor de las armas: QUIERO INVENTARME QUE ÉSTE ES EL MEJOR DE LOS MUNDOS POSIBLES

Leibniz's Summation

Of some significance, here I post a summation of Spinoza's philosophy, as passed through the mouth of a loyal friend, Tschirnhaus, and as relayed to Leibniz in 1675, originally published in English by Wim Klever. It draws out some curious Klever might say esoteric aspects of Spinoza's thinking. Most distinct about it is the notion that Spinoza held a Pythagorian idea of a transmigration of the Mind. Besides the obvious distortions that can be brought about through one man telling another man what someone else believes, there remains the possibility that the account is somehow intentionally colored in details, either to couch Spinoza, or to put him in a personally favorable light:

As Klever relates:

"In spite of Spinoza's warning that Tschirnhaus should be reluctant in communicating what he had received for private use, we know that Tschirnhaus nonetheless revealed many secrets to the inquisitive Leibniz. This appears from a note written by Leibniz which he must have made shortly after a meeting. I think it worthwhile to quote this note here in full because it enables us to see how Spinoza's doctrine was perceived, understood, and explained by his friends and followers in or around 1675. A second reason is that this note which is not known by many scholars and iis not yet available otherwise in English contains several interesting points which cannot be found elsewhere and is also for that reason relevant:

Sir Tischirnhaus told me many things about the handwritten book of Spinoza. There is a merchant in Amsterdam, called Gerrit Gilles [Jarig Jelles] I think who supports Spinoza. Spinoza's book will be about God, mind, happiness or the idea of the perfect man, the recovery of the mind and the recovery of the body. He asserts the demonstration of a number of things about God. The he alone is free. He supposes that freedom exists when the action or determination originates not from an external impact, but only from the nature of the actor. In this sense he justly ascribes freedom to God alone.

According to him the mind itself is in a certain sense a part of God. He thinks that there is a sense in all things to the degrees of their existence. God is defined by him as an absolutely infinite Being, which contains all perfections, i.e. affirmations or realities or what may be conceived. Likewise only God would be substance or a Being which exists in itself, or which can be understood by itself; all creatures are nothing else other than modes. Man is free insofar as he is not determined by any external things. But because this is never the case, man is not free at all, though he participates more in freedom than the bodies.

The mind would be nothing but the idea of the body. He thinks that the unity of the bodies is caused by a certain pressure. Most people's philosophy starts with creatures, Des Cartes started with the mind, he [Spinoza] starts with God. Extension does not imply divisibility as was unduly supposed by Descartes; although he supposed to see this also clearly, he fell into the error that the mind acts on the body or is acted upon by the body.

He thinks that we will forget most things when we die and retain only those things that we know with the kind of knowledge that he calls intuitive, of which of which only a few are conscious. Because knowledge is either sensual, imaginative, or intuitive. He believes a sort of Pythagorical transmigration, namely that the mind goes from body to body. He says that Christ is the very best philosopher. He thinks that apart from thought and extension there are an infinity of other positive attributes, but that in all of them there is thought like here in extension. How they are constituted cannot be conceived by us but every one is infinite like space here ("Spinoza's life and works" Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, 46-47)

I posted below some rough thoughts I had some time ago, and their related Spinoza texts. Klever's evidence of a kind of at least percieved Pythagorian transmigration adds an esoteric meaning to Spinoza's mathematization. And while I cannot conceive how such a transformation could be understood within the propositions of the Ethics [on what account is the preservation of identity maintained], it does give conceptual context for some of the more difficult to interpret passages on this issue.

Notable as well is the summation's deviation from Spinoza's theory of the three knowledges as found in the Ethics. Here, the trinity of "imaginary, rational, intuitive" has become "sensual, imaginary, intuitive". Assuming an accurate translation of the passage, this may give some clue to the differences of Spinoza's treatment of the Imaginary and Order (spoken about here, in Spinoza's Two Concepts of Order). Professor Della Rocca in correspondence had affirmed his belief that Spinoza is somewhat inconsistent in his treatment of "order" in the various parts of the Ethics. What is suggested by the Leibniz summation, perhaps, is that even the rational, propositional conception of true and free in Spinoza is still imaginary; this may be linked to Spinoza's variation on whether we can or cannot ever have wholly Adequate Ideas.

Taylor Adkins, from Fractal Ontology, has graciously shared with me some advanced rough drafts of his continuing translations of François Laruelle’s work from French into English. This morning I read one of the more introductory, programmatic pieces he sent — the preface and introduction to Principles of Non-Philosophy. This outlines in broad strokes Laruelle’s notion of “non-philosophy,” which, from what I gather, is one of the central themes of his work. The work exhibits an uncommon originality in its interpretations of traditional philosophical (and extra-philosophical) problems, accompanied by a casual erudition which appeals to my tastes greatly. Personally, I do foresee problems (or at least significant obstacles) which will present themselves to Laruelle’s enterprise, which may be dealt with more or less adequacy. Given the competence and ingenuity he displays in this short piece, however, I have no doubt that he will make an honest go of it. It would be ridiculous, in any case, to demand an exhaustive treatment or solution to these problems from a work which he openly admits is propaedeutic in its function (i.e., it only aims to be “the most complete introduction to non-philosophy in the absence of its realization”).

What follows are my initial thoughts in response to this piece. I will refrain from idle speculation into those sections which exceed my topical familiarity at present, and focus mostly on some of the references and implications which I take to be most plainly evident in the text. In this way I might perform some small service of gratitude to Taylor for offering his work for discussion, contributing the occasional insights my background makes available for those who are interested. It is quite possible that my own take on what Laruelle is trying to say is mistaken; aware of this fact, I welcome criticism and correction from all sides.

Departing from the continental orientation toward questions of ontology (the logic of Being) and its differential corollary of alterity which has predominated in recent years, Laruelle grounds his exposition of “non-philosophy” in its (ontology’s) traditional rival, henology (the logic of the One). This classification is misleading, however. For Laruelle’s conception of the One is highly idiosyncratic. It differs in many respects from the object of the classical Platonic, Stoical, and Spinozistic henologies — the One(s) which philosophically ground(s) the order of appearances in their modal correspondence and community with one another.

On this point we may elaborate. Specifically, Laruelle seems to take issue with the place the One occupies within philosophies and mystical tradition, as something which is accomplished or realized through the relation of its subsidiary modes. This holds whether the One is reached by speculative/dialectical ascent (as in transcendental and Hegelian logic) or through revelation or religious vision (as in mysticism). This is why categorizing Laruelle’s thought as henological is potentially confused, because any “logic” which is thought to articulate the One cannot be conceived as literal. It can appear only in scare-quotes, since the One “is immanent (to) itself rather than to a form of thought, to a ‘logic.’”

Instead of being a mere object of philosophical and mystical discourse, a metaphysical ultimate, Laruelle therefore suggests that the One is already the Real, and constitutes the sole ground by which experience (and thus philosophy) are even possible. The inversion lies here: the One does not philosophically ground reality; rather, the One really grounds philosophy (along with every other mode of knowledge or experience). Moreover, this ground is original — which is to say that it does not follow from anything, but everything follows from it. Hence his repeated emphasis on the transcendental status of the One (the Kantian “conditions necessary for the possibility of”). These two aspects, the original and the transcendental qualities of Laruelle’s One, together form the critical points on which the thrust of his argument rides.

These may be briefly elaborated. We shall begin hermeneutically, investigating the “original” dimension of Laruelle’s notion of the One. I assert that this lies plainly in its appellation as a “[r]adically immanent identity.” “Radical” is here not taken in its vulgar sense as indicating extremity, but rather in its more basic Latin sense (derived from radix, radicalis), designating the One’s originary status as the “root” of all else. Laruelle, well-versed in Kant, is doubtless aware of this meaning of “radical,” as Kant so famously employed it in his discussion of “radical evil” in his 1793 Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone.

The “transcendental” aspect of the One appears in the threefold delineation of the “terms” which Laruelle takes it to “contain.” He describes these terms as “[1] a real or indivisible identity—the One-Real; [2] a term = X properly called, received from transcendence and which therefore is not immanent; [3] finally a term called ‘transcendental Identity,’ a veritable clone of the One which the term = X extracts from the Real.” Laruelle quickly reminds the reader that “in reality” (the way it is in-itself) the One is not reducible to any of these “terms.”† However, an elucidation of these terms is appropriate to our discussion.

The first term bears the most similarity with mystical notions of the One, akin perhaps to the apeiron of Greek cosmology (the primal, formless chaos of Anaxagoras, Anaximander, etc.). It illustrates its primordial, undifferentiated identity.

The second term obviously alludes to the crucial passage in Kant’s “Transcendental Deduction” in the first (1781, A) edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, wherein he explains the proposition “A = B” (that is to say, the relation of subject to object, the “dyad” of which Laruelle speaks) rests on the transcendental possibility of their relation = X. As Laruelle writes, this term is “received from transcendence” because it transcendentally (noumenally) grounds the relation of a subject and a predicate which appear (phenomenally) unlike. Kant describes this as a necessary postulate of reason, a negative limit which can be invoked but not positively described. Laruelle later (implicitly) chides the reflective wonder which Kant tacitly adopted from Leibniz‡ in viewing the amenability of the objective world to subjective cognition of it as justifying “the postulation of a ‘miracle,’ common sense or pre-established harmony, which dedicates philosophy to begging the question.”

The final term, as Laruelle tells us, is abstracted/extracted (“over” and “out”) from this relation (X). In this respect the One is a clone (thereby ectypal) rather than original (archetypal) because it is conditioned by our empirical recognition of the relation by which we identify it. The dyad of A = B vows “revenge” on its duality, on its mutual alienation from its other, and “resigns its desire by extracting an image from the One (of) the One where the latter is not alienated.” I suspect this refers to the Hegelian henology, and accounts for the reciprocality of its 2/3 and 3/2 “fractional matrix.” The “3” side invariably refers to the transcendentally exterior “synthesis,” while the “2” refers to the immanently interior dualism of “thesis” and “antithesis” (to use crude Fichtean terms).

It is my belief that Laruelle intends to identify non-philosophy primarily with the first of these terms, the “One-Real.” Only this term is truly original and “radically immanent.” The second term, by contrast, is based on an observation of a relation in Being and is thus ontological; the third term simply takes this ontic relation and purifies it logically. Laruelle suggests that Marxism came close to making the “discovery/invention” (a beautiful paradox) of the One-in-One or One-Real, by inverting Hegel’s idealism into materialism/realism. Still, it had fallen prey to the old Hegelian practice of scolding the “common consciousness” (only now it was “false consciousness”) as an “ideological” byproduct over which it exalted itself as a material science. Again it fell back on assigning to ordinary cognition a regrettable status as non-philosophical, or “unscientific” (to use a Leninist epithet).

Laruelle says early on that philosophy should remove itself from its elitism, reconciled with “democracy.” In granting non-philosophy some efficacy of its own (autonomy), he hopes to liberate it from its theodical subordination to the triumph of philosophical consciousness. And while non-philosophy might never be “the educator of philosophy,” it should nevertheless be understood as equiprimordial with it. In providing a genetic account (from and not to) of their ontological bifurcation from the henological One, Laruelle might help philosophy forget its vanity and see the common origins (roots) it shares with non-philosophy, whether “common consciousness” or even regional knowledges (natural sciences, disciplines).

Fußballerisch gesprochen: Ein Pass geht auch leicht mal daneben, wenn man technisch nicht so hochgezüchtet ist wie die Portugiesen oder Spanier. Die Blutgrätsche dagegen klappt in der Regel immer, zur Not erwischt man halt nur den Gegner. Und wenn die Blutgrätsche auch nicht sehr elegant ist, natürlich, so ist sie immer noch eleganter als der Gegner, wenn er mit der Nase im Rasen landet.

Darum auch das große Erschrecken hierzulande über die Korruptionsmethoden bei Siemens. International, das war zu hören, ist das alles absolut üblich, man steckt sich eben gegenseitig das Geld in die Taschen, während alle anderen wegsehen, aber einem Deutschen darf man das nicht erzählen. Der glaubt an Anständigkeit, Aufrichtigkeit, Blutgrätsche. Zur Not jagen wir den Schlitzaugen den technischen Fortschritt mit Kampfgeist ab! Aber das funktioniert ja inzwischen kaum mehr auf dem Fußballplatz.

Ja, das Filigrane, das zweideutig Geschärfte, die klare, aber diffizile Form – das ist nicht so das Ding der deutschen Seele. Zu wenig Seele ist vielleicht darin? Die Seele ist ja eher etwas Schwabbeliges, wie ein Bierbauch. Andererseits erfinden die Deutschen (Leibniz, Konrad Zuse) das Seelenlose schlechthin, den Computer, den Automaten. Was für ein Widerspruch!

Darüber hat Gottfried Benn ja immer sehr geklagt, über die deutsche Sehnsucht nach Breiigkeit. Auch Nietzsche fand sie eher abstoßend.

Der Deutsche, dieser geborene Dunstkopf, braucht Atmosphäre, er braucht „Bildungssmog“ (Thomas Knoefel), der in dicken Schwaden um die Goethe-, Kleist- und Hegel-Büsten im Wohnzimmer wogt. „Noch eine Zigarre, mein Junge? Oder einen Schnaps?“ Der Deutsche macht seine Arbeit, die macht er ordentlich, und dann geht er in die Kneipe und trinkt sein Bier, und das macht er auch ordentlich. Ich sage das gar nicht abwertend, ich trinke selbst gerne Bier. Ich sage das nur, weil der Deutsche das Tier ist, das nicht wahrhaben will, dass es so ist, wie es ist. Ich selbst bin übrigens letztlich doch vollkommen anders. Ich komme nur nicht dazu. (Geklaut bei Christian Dietrich Grabbe.)

end point. end point based on objective thought sets, by logic, by cause and effect. Though, there are many ways to do some things, Sometimes, there is only one.

Thus, eliminating the need for argument, as the language evolves, as the language IS the knowledge, more and more. What is, experienced FACT considered. What is workably true, in actual practice.

Mathematical reasoning being applied IN your thoughts and experiences. Figuring what is in fact True, and what is False.

F.W.J. Schelling

MAN AS AN IRONY WITHIN NATURE:

SCHELLING AND THE PRESENCE OF EVIL

Ross Wolfe

Western philosophy after Augustine traditionally accorded to evil a merely negative ontological status.† That is to say, evil was considered to be the result of a privatio boni, or privation of goodness. Evil's essential feature thus appeared in this model as absence. One might well have asked: "What specifically is absent from evil?" - to which it would be answered that evil indicates a lack of the universal goodness contained in God's original creation. Evil was thought to stem from the imperfections inherent in created substance and the negativity this entailed ("the so-called malum metaphysicum," as Schelling chided),[1] a postlapsarian fragmentation resulting from the first act of moral evil, or sin.

This explanation was meant as a monistic solution to the theodical problem of the origin of evil. It aimed to preserve God's predicate omnibenevolence without resorting to a Manichaean dualism.[2] This conception of evil further allowed for the development of modern theodicy, a genre perhaps best represented by Leibniz's eighteenth century masterpiece.[3] For now the appearance of evil could be seen as only setting the stage, so to speak, for the realization/revelation of the greater glory of God. The drama of this struggle with evil was severely curtailed, however, for the divine victory (the apocatastasis) was already guaranteed from the beginning - or from eternity, rather. The faithful could rest at ease, assured that Providence would prevail.

There were, however, those who were not satisfied with the answer provided by Augustine and his successors regarding the nature of evil. To define evil as a simple lack or absence of the good would seem to rob it of its existential efficacy. Moreover, it runs counter to our experience of evil, in which it possesses a real and positively terrifying power. The conception of evil as an abstract negation, an ontological nothing, effectively neuters it of its energy. Evil is not simply a moment meant to be overcome, wholly subordinate to the triumph of the good. It has a force and a vitality all its own. Or, as the Bavarian theosophist Franz Xaver von Baader put it in an 1807 article, evil can be considered antithetic to the good "only in that positive sense [my italics] of a perversity and corruption in which one says that that which is human turns into that which is inhuman, nature turns into unnature, form and shape turn into that which is unshaped."[4]

Echoing Baader's claim, the prominent idealist philosopher F.W.J. Schelling took to answering the problem of evil in his 1809 treatise, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom. The ontological quality (affirmative or negative) of evil was central to his exposition of mankind's volitional apparatus.[5] For Schelling, true freedom would require not only that the good might be denied, but also that evil might be affirmed. "All other explanations of evil," he wrote, "leave the understanding and moral consciousness equally unsatisfied. They all rest fundamentally on the annihilation of evil as a positive opposite [...]."[6] The relegation of evil to abstract nothingness was preposterous to Schelling. For while surely evil can be called the negative of the good, no less can the good be called the negative of evil. This negativity is maintained only by virtue of its relation of opposition to its other, whereby each side is only determinately negative (to use Hegelian terms). Neither side is an abstract nothing; rather, it is a concrete (determinate) something. In other words, their mutual opposition implies their respective position, i.e., their positive status as existent. This is what Schelling means by conceiving "evil as a positive opposite." It suggests that evil must not be simply thought of as the passive absence of God's grace, but rather as the active presence of the dæmonic in Spirit.

However, if Schelling was to be so bold as to assert the reality of evil, whence could it be said to have come? Augustine's explanation, for all its felt defects, nevertheless had the advantage of exonerating God from responsibility for the origin of evil in the world. Insistence upon a positive conception of evil's reality would appear to compromise God's infinite goodness, since (as the creator of all things that have been made) He would then be guilty of creating wickedness itself. If one wishes to maintain God's moral perfection, the only alternative would seem to lie in following a strict dualism, wherein a separate (evil) reality would exist utterly unconditioned by the creative activity of God. But Schelling contended that this apparent double-bind is in fact a false dichotomy. It is possible, he maintained, to give an account of evil which does not fall into the "dualistic" traps of Manichaeanism or the "Kabbalistic" traps of Leibnizian philosophy. Philosophers who claim that no other options are available simply have not made an honest go of it.[7] Defending this assertion would prove no easy matter, however, as it demanded a fundamental overhaul of the established cosmotheological framework as it then stood. Yet Schelling's systematic treatment of freedom seemed to hinge upon him making good on this claim.

Proper excogitation of the issue required a rather involved digression into the origin of the universe. From this vantage, it might then be seen the place that evil occupies therein. For if evil could be said to exist in the world - a creation that is existentially dependent upon its creator - its essential possibility must be derivable from a principle contained within the first principle (the cosmotheological arché, God).[8]

A few remarks regarding Schelling's methodology must be made before proceeding into the thick of his argument, however. Happily, the analysis of his approach will lead directly to the foundational distinction Schelling draws in the Philosophical Investigations. To begin with, one must recognize the latent import of Schelling's earlier philosophy of identity† on this later work (which, with an eye to the rest of his corpus, must be viewed as transitional). In this prior system, the ultimate unity of the manifold antinomies of philosophy was holistically posited in the Absolute. Subject and object, mind and nature, I and not-I, ideal and real, etc. - all these coincide in the eternity of the whole. Any metaphysics that took one of its sides to the exclusion of its other was deemed by Schelling to be "dogmatic" (following a line modified from Kant's first Critique). Likewise, a metaphysics which purported to solve an alleged impasse within monistic philosophy by making a dualism between these sides absolute (like Manichaeanism) was equally unacceptable. Schelling compared the explication of a consistently monistic system to working one's way through a Gordian knot: the latter (Manichaean) solution proved far too drastic, and was really no solution at all; in the end it would only sever the single rope into two incommensurable sides. It would be his task in the Philosophical Investigations to demonstrate the way in which the various folds of the knot all belonged to a single (universal) rope.[9] This would reveal the basic unity of the multiplicity, the universality of its particulars. Or, to use Schelling's words, it allows for "the only correct dualism, namely that which at the same time permits a unity."[10]

This brings us to the pivotal distinction of Schelling's cosmotheological system in this work: the bifurcation of ground and existence within Being. The relevance of this distinction to his conception of evil will be revealed in the course of its unfolding. Schelling arrives at this while mapping the ontology of God's existence. Indeed, this is the quandary endemic to existential explanations of the self-caused cause, or causa sui. With other objects (or entia, more properly) of experience, the relationship between ground and existence is unproblematic. For one can easily say that a possible ground existed in reality which subsequently gave rise to the object's actual existence. But with God, seemingly intractable difficulties are introduced. "Since nothing is [my italics] prior to, or outside of, God," Schelling writes, "[H]e must have the ground of [H]is existence in [H]imself."[11] The copula "is" at the outset of this phrase is especially important, since it denotes existence as such. Nothing can be said to exist "before" God's existence, yet this would seem to preclude the provision of an existential ground for His actual being. God, qua Being, would seem to require that ground and existence mutually entail one another. Heidegger, in his celebrated 1936 lectures on the freedom treatise, framed Schelling's answer as follows: "The ground in God is that which God as [H]imself is not and which still is not outside of [H]im."[12] Discrete qualities must be identifiable within God's Being which would distinguish ground from existence and determine their relationship, but each reciprocally admits of a higher unity with its other. Schelling's appreciation of this notion's subtle intricacy seems to indicate the acute influence that the German mystic Jacob Boehme had begun to exercise over his works.[13]

One final caveat must be issued before continuing further. This concerns the spurious application of temporal notions of priority to the relation of God's ground and existence. The Being of God, insofar as it is Absolute, is outside of categories pertaining to time. Time by its very nature implies serial differentiation, and such difference would vanish in the eternity of God's existence. The precedence is better conceived as logical, but in a very specific sense. God's existence cannot logically proceed from His ground with geometric (apodictic) necessity, as this would immediately lead to Spinozism.[14] Instead, it must be understood as following from the logic of God's willful essence, which, as we shall see, is contained within His ground as "yearning." Schelling himself anticipates this objection in the text, and duly preempts it. He makes the analogy of light's relationship to gravity, in which gravity must be presupposed as light's "dark ground," which itself could not be conceived without assuming its illumination. Linking these analogues back to his conception of God, Schelling explains: "God has in [H]imself an inner ground of [H]is existence that in this respect precedes [H]im in existence; but, precisely in this way, God is again the prius of the ground in so far as the ground, even as such, could not exist if God did not exist actu."[15]

Of these twin aspects of God's Being, His ground and existence, Schelling begins by detailing the former. A number of symbols (the "initial darkness," "anarchy," "disorder," etc.) are used interchangeably to represent the ground. In this sense, God's ground is not unlike the apeiron, the primal chaos of Greek cosmology. Its nature is fundamentally entropic. Yet within the "wave-wound, whirling sea"[16] of the ground there essentially emerges a desiring will, "the yearning the eternal One feels to give birth to itself." This yearning is not identical with its object (self-birth) or the subject (the One) of which it is an affect, but "is after all co-eternal with [the One]," as Schelling indicates. It is a will without understanding, purely unconscious, naïvely erotic; or, as Dale Snow beautifully put it, it is an "inchoate longing,"[17] striving after "unfathomable unity."[18] The ground, in giving birth to itself, is thus presented as the abysmal matrix (in its original sense, qua womb) from which the radiance of God's existence is eternally begotten.† Nowhere is Boehme's impact on Schelling's thought more noticeable. For Boehme, the eternal beginning is in fact an "eternal nothing" which is nothing less than "a craving for something," or a "will to something." This will, as a desire and an attraction (Boehme's language is marked by a distinct eroticism), "becomes desirous in itself" and "is thus magical and impregnates itself as with spirit."[19] God's ground can therefore been seen to be the eternal Theotokos to which Mary is the historical counterpart. In relation to God's existence qua His actuality, the ground may be regarded as His potency,[20] or, to use the feminine equivalent specific to our conception of the ground, its own fertility.

Opposed to, yet rooted in, God's ground for Being is His brilliant existence. By contrast with its antinomy, the divine actuality is symbolized by "rule, order, and form." God's existence has its own will, the will of the understanding, set against the will As Schelling realized, God's existence could only be conceived by way of its conception in the darkness, i.e., its birth. He offers a string of stunning analogies in support of this contention, drawing parallels between the human experience of birth and cognition in order to make sense of God's Being. In this sense, Schelling's theogeny is radically anthropological, since it is clearly patterned after human examples. Regardless, Schelling would probably say that the inverse holds equally true, and that his analogies are simply didactic in their (human) point of departure. The illustrations Schelling provides are, in any case, scarcely less than poetry. He writes:

All birth is birth from darkness into light; the seed kernel must be sunk into the earth and die in darkness so that the more beautiful shape of light may lift and unfold itself in the radiance of the sun. Man is formed in the maternal body; and only from the obscurity of that which is without understanding (from feeling, yearning, the sovereign mother of knowledge) grow luminous thoughts. Thus we must imagine the original yearning as it directs itself to the understanding, though still not recognizing it, just was we in our yearning seek out unknown and nameless good...[21]

The void of the ground is itself the impetus for God's existential issuing-forth. The seed is submerged into the dark earth. The embryo lies wrapped in the black infinity of the womb. Thoughts take shape in the emptiness of ignorance. From these meager germs, however, a blinding luminosity floods the depths of the abyss. So is the relation of God's ground to His existence and vice versa. The two sides are indissolubly bound in the Oneness of their absolution, just as all distinctions converge harmoniously for Plato's demiurge, at home in its eternity - indivisible, seamless, unchanging.[22]

But all that has been hitherto discussed is atemporally self-contained in God's eternal Being, a unity which allows for no chronological differentiation. However, corresponding to the static changelessness of Being, there appears the delineated reflection of God's dark ground in the "primordial nature" of Becoming. This is intended to account for the world of objects, since "the concept of becoming is the only one appropriate to the nature of things."[23] The dialectical shift seems sudden, but it is justified by the logic immanent to Schelling's prior distinctions. For the realization of God's existence in the actuality of Being gives rise to "an inner, reflexive representation" of His Being, the so-called divine logos or Word. This representation is simultaneously God's intellect, which radically differentiates amorphous nature into the temporal unfolding or gradual self-revelation of His providential will. This is the moment of creation, the swing from Being to Becoming, which is but an imperfect representation of the former.[24]

The mechanics of this operation might still seem obscure. Some review and further elucidation is perhaps appropriate. At first, the universe resides in the swirling chaos of the divine ground, in God, yet not "He Himself." The intellect (God's understanding, the Word), driven by a yearning directly opposite to the yearning of the ground (which itself strives after "unfathomable unity"), in turn engenders an irrepressible differentiation and ordering of primal nature. As it was for Anaxagoras, the Mind (Nous) of God enters into the ataxic apeiron of the ground and rends it asunder. The blind, shapeless chaos of the ground which at first dominates the dark expanse of creation is fractured and molded into definite forms. Time is born; the earth learns the modulation of midday and twilight, of dusk and dawn. Objects acquire determinate length, height, and depth. But the darkness of the ground in nature is not annihilated completely. It persists in "the incomprehensible base of reality in things, the indivisible remainder."[25] Catastrophe and disruption are merely tempered by apparent uniformity and regularity. The planets roll on in the black void of space, dark orbs spinning along their elliptical itineraries. Universal law just barely masks the original entropy of creation.

The struggle of these two rival forces, now firmly situated within Becoming, eventually gives birth to their mirror-image, in which they are sundered. Out of the germ of the understanding placed in the ground of creation, there arises an irony within nature, a heightened spirituality - in short, mankind. "[T]hrough advancing mutation and division of all forces, the deepest and most inner point of initial darkness in a being is finally transfigured wholly into the light."[26] From nature itself an intellect surfaces and shatters the naïve homogeneity of the world. Schelling characterizes this as an "awakening," in which "the innermost bond of forces loosens itself only in a gradually occurring unfolding."[27] The soul of man enters in upon the stage of world history. His is the particularized will cast in the image of the universal will of God. This will is the spiritual token of his freedom, symbolizing his inescapable capacity for individuation. It is the "divine panorama of life, locked up within the depths, which God beheld as he fashioned the will to nature." By virtue of his birth in the ground of God's existence, man enjoys moral autonomy independent of God's will, and is thus the author of his decisions.[28]

Furthermore, the ontological ground and existence of God are reconstituted in the soul of man, as spirit, albeit in a modified sense. It is the nature of this modification that reintroduces us to our discussion of the subject of evil. For the particular will of man is the mirror opposite of the universal will of God; the inseparable quality of darkness and light (ground and existence) in the divine Being is thus inverted. Schelling notes that it is only this inversion that makes possible God's revelation at all. "The same unity that is inseverable in God," he writes, "must therefore be severable in man - and this is the possibility of evil."[29] This notion is not an entirely Schellingean invention. It surely finds prior expression in Plato's Timaeus, for example, where the demiurge proclaims to his creation that "[t]hose works whose father I am, being created by me, are indissoluble without my consent. Anything bonded together can of course be dissolved, though only an evil will would consent to dissolve anything whose composition and state were good."[30] Man is capable of such wanton evil only because he belongs to a higher spiritual order than the rest of creation. The possibility of evil exists precisely because man possesses a moral will which may freely affirm the darkness over the light. Only this vitiating power befits the dignity of man's freedom, which may choose evil just as positively as it can choose the good.[31]

Having now traced, at long last, the origin of evil according to Schelling's Philosophical Investigations, what else can be said of its qualities? How can we describe its presence? It would exceed the scope of this essay to recapitulate the complexities of Schelling's apologia for free will, but some elaboration on the points of these questions might be allowed before we arrive at our conclusion. The positive essence of evil (qua existent, real) can be investigated with relative economy.

Schelling describes the evil in creation as falling under two basic metaphysical categories. The first of these he terms "general evil[,] which, if not exactly of the beginning, is first awoken in the original revelation of God by the reaction of the ground." This is natural evil, having not yet attained to spirit. Evil as privation might be understood as falling under this category, since it "never becomes real, yet continually strives toward this end."[32] This evil appears as the meaningless brutality of primordial nature, the nameless suffering of beasts without mind. Its activity is essentially indeterminate. There is no rhyme or reason to it, only absence of purpose.

Against this Schelling sets the particular, determinate evil of mankind. This is, in some sense, simply a more radical (spiritualized) perversion of the generality of natural evil.[33] Schelling narrates this within his cosmotheology as follows: "Once evil had been generally aroused in creation by the reaction of the ground to revelation, man apprehended him from eternity in his individuality and selfishness, and all who are born are born with the dark principle of evil within even if this evil is raised to self-consciousness."[34] This inborn wickedness (or "natural propensity to evil") amounts to what Kant had coined "radical evil" in his 1794 treatise Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone.[35] But in contrast to its natural (general) antipode, spiritual (particular) evil, as part of the moral psychology of man, is teleological (i.e., it involves purposive actions). This accounts for the truly terrifying quality of moral (or anthropological) evil. For man is doubtless a product of the natural world, yet he stands in higher spiritual relation to God. He is thus able to direct his rational energies to evil ends, to try and bend the natural world to his selfish will. Acts of moral evil can certainly be said to have a rationale, just as with acts of goodwill. Man's spiritual capacity for rational reflection holds him above the amoral expanse of dumb nature. Schelling seized upon this notion from Baader's article, in which the latter wrote: "Man can unfortunately only stand above or under animals."[36] To call wicked acts "bestial" or "brutish" is therefore a misnomer. "Animals are never able to emerge," Schelling asserts, "from unity [of dark and light forces], whereas man can voluntarily tear apart the eternal bond of forces." Nature is guiltless in its darkest moments; conversely, man is guilty in even his most minor transgressions. After all, one's acts can only be called inhuman if he is human to begin with.

Such are the formal grounds for the particularity of moral evil, concentrated in the principle of darkness in man. But this does not exhaust its description. Of what does evil properly (existentially) consist? Schelling answers this question emphatically. The root of all evil action can lies in man's striving "to elevate [his selfhood] into the ruling and total will and, conversely, to make the spiritual within himself into a means."[37] In other words, the particular will of an individual tries to raise itself to the status of the universal will, which can in actu belong only to God. This is the result of man's hubris, his "overweening pride," as Schelling puts it. It represents a reversal of the principle of movement by which his individuality was first made manifest:

[t]he will that steps out from its being beyond nature, in order as general will to make itself at once particular and creaturely, strives to reverse the relation of the principles, to elevate the ground over the cause [God's revelation in actuality, or nature], to use the spirit that it obtained only for the sake of the centrum [God's existential will in nature] outside the centrum and against creatures; from this results collapse within the will and outside it.[38]

Thus it appears that the form of all moral evil is ultimately satanic, in that it is driven by the conceit of the will that would subordinate all of creation to its self. This evil is inextricably bound to the self-affirmation (note the positivity) of a particular will which, in its vanity, seeks to rule over the world. Man's original act of vanity was disastrous for all of creation and his place therein; the "collapse within the will and outside it" alludes to the Fall, whereby the spirit of the world was alienated from the will of God (the centrum). Schelling's stance on this matter again betrays the influence of Boehme, for whom positive egoism was the root of all moral evil. For it was Boehme who wrote that "each will desires a purity in the other being [anything not itself] without turba, but itself possesses the turba in itself and is also the loathing of the other...And all violence of the world originates due to and from this so that each one rules over the other."[39]

Having discovered the positive root of moral evil, Schelling reiterates his ardent opposition to the impotent view of evil as the privatio boni put forth by Augustine. The categorization of the good under that "lifeless concept of the positive according to which only privation [in this model, evil] could oppose it" was philosophically defunct. Taking an opposite route, starting from the position of moral evil, the proper understanding of sinfulness can be seen to lie in man's affirmation of the unity of his self, in which the multiplicity of difference that surrounds him is supposed to vanish.[40] The wickedness of man cannot be thought so banal as to result from his mere frailty - the notion that he passively succumbs to his sensuous nature.[41] Kant had already demonstrated the poverty of this conception.[42] "[I]t is necessary," Schelling writes, "that a kind of being be in evil as well as in good, but in the former as that which is opposed to the good, that which perverts the temperance of the good into distemperance."[43]

The logic of our thesis can be seen to have come full circle. Schelling granted to evil its proper recognition as a positive (that is to say, existent) property of creation. It sprang from the dark recesses of the ground encompassed by God's Being, ripped from its eternal unity with the existential light therein by the spirit of man. Evil is not a lack but is rather constitutive of the nature of the created world. It is coextensively present alongside the good, embodied in the egoistic (satanic) self-affirmation of the particular will over the universal will of God. Oppositely, mankind's salvation rests in the spiritual submission of its particularity to the centrum of God's will in nature. The struggle of these existent forces within the static eternity of God's Being-in-Himself and the dynamic temporality of His creation (His Being-in-another) obtains throughout as the defining conflict of the cosmos.

NOTES

† This generally holds true for both religious and secular philosophy up to the 19^th century, including Enlightenment philanthropism.

[1] Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom. Translated and introduced by Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt. (State University of New York Press. Albany, NY: 2006). Pg. 36.

[2] "Evil is not a nature if it is that which is contrary to nature. Yet you [Manichaeans] claim that evil is a certain nature and substance...[I]f you are willing to put aside all obstinacy, you will see that evil is that which falls away from essence and tends to non-being." St. Augustine of Hippo. The Catholic and Manichaean Ways of Life (De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae et de Moribus Manichaeorum). Translated by Donald A. Gallagher and Idella J. Gallagher. (The Catholic University of America Press. Washington, D.C.: 1966). Pgs. 66-67.

[3] Leibniz was in complete agreement with Augustine when it came to the ontological status of sin: "The explanation of the cause of evil by a particular principle, per principium maleficum, is of the same nature [as any spurious causal explanation of essentially negative phenomena]. Evil needs no such explanation, any more than do cold and darkness: there is neither a primum frigidum nor principle of darkness. Evil itself comes only from privation; the positive enters therein only by concomitance." Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil. Translated by E.M. Huggard, edited and introduced by Austin Farrer. (Open Court Publishers. LaSalle, IL: 1985). Pg. 219, §153.

[4] Franz Xaver von Baader. "On the Assertion that there can be No Wicked Use of Freedom." From Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom. Translated and introduced by Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt. (State University of New York Press. Albany, NY: 2006). Pg. 101.

[5] "[T]he real and vital concept is that freedom is the capacity for good and evil." Schelling, Philosophical Investigations. Pg. 23.

[6] Ibid., pg. 35.

[7] "[I]n order to prove that there are only two manners of explaining evil - the dualistic, according to which there is assumed an evil fundamental being, no matter with which modifications, under or next to the good one, and the Kabbalistic, according to which evil is explained through emanation and distancing - and that every other system therefore must abolish the distinction between good and evil; in order to prove this, nothing less would be required than the full power of a deeply thought-out and thoroughly developed philosophy." Ibid., pg. 73.

[8] Ibid., pg. 40.

† As developed in his 1800 System of Transcendental Philosophy and other works. Anyone familiar with Hegel's philosophy will recognize the similarity this bears to his approach.

[9] "To transfer an absolute dualism of good and evil to history whereby the one or the other principle prevails in all manifestations and works of the human spirit, whereby there are only two systems and two religions, one absolutely good and another simply evil; further, the opinion that everything began in purity and simplicity and all subsequent developments...were only decay and falsification - while this whole view serves critique as a powerful sword of Alexander with which to chop the Gordian knot in two everywhere, it introduces into history, however, a thoroughly illiberal and highly reductive point of view." Ibid., pg. 74.

[10] Ibid., pg. 30n.

[11] Ibid., pg. 27.

[12] Martin Heidegger. Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. (Ohio University Press. Athens, OH: 1985). Pg. 111.

[13] Mentioning this fact has become something of a platitude in Schelling scholarship, but its truth is undiminished by such complaints. For almost two hundred years earlier, the latter, in his obscure and fragmentary Mysterium Pansophicum, Boehme had written that "[w]hereas two beings have thus been from eternity, we cannot say that one stands next to the other and takes hold of itself, that one seizes the other, and we also cannot say that one stands outside of the other and that there is by no means a parting." Jacob Boehme. Mysterium Pansophicum, or Thorough Report on the Earthly and Heavenly Mysterium. From Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom. Translated and introduced by Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt. (State University of New York Press. Albany, NY: 2006). Pg. 89.

[14] Against Spinoza's pantheism, which treated God or Nature (deus sive natura) as if it were a cadaver to be dissected, Schelling famously claimed that "[i]n the divine understanding there is a system; yet God himself is not a system, but rather a life." Schelling, Philosophical Investigations. Pg. 62.

[15] "[A]s far as this precedence [of ground to existence] is concerned, it is to be thought neither as precedence according to time nor as a priority of being." Ibid., pgs. 27-28.

[16] Ibid., pg. 30.

[17] Dale Snow. Schelling and the End of Idealism. (State University of New York Press. Albany, NY: 1996). Pg. 163.

[18] Schelling, Philosophical Investigations. Pg. 28.

† As with God the Father's relation to the Son in the Nicene articulation of the Trinity. However, for

Schelling and Boehme, the ground appears to be (at least symbolically) feminized.

[19] Boehme, Mysterium Pansophicum. Pgs. 85-87.

[20] "[I]n the initial creation, which is nothing other than the birth of light, the dark principle had to be as ground so that the light could be raised out of it (as from mere potency to actuality)." Schelling, Philosophical Investigations. Pg. 44.

[21] Ibid., pgs. 29-30.

[22] Schelling was admittedly influenced by Plato's Timaeus, which had appeared in fresh translation by "the sturdy Böckh." Ibid., pg. 41n.

The passages pertaining to the demiurge's "eternally unchanging nature" can be found in the Timaeus. Plato. Timaeus. From Timaeus and Critias. Translated, introduced, and appended by Desmond Lee. (Penguin Books. New York, NY: 1977). Pgs. 40-41.

[23] Schelling, Philosophical Investigations. Pg. 28.

[24] Ibid., pgs. 29-30.

[25] Ibid., pg. 29.

[26] Ibid., pg. 32.

[27] Ibid., pg. 31.

[28] "Because he [man] emerges from the Ground (is creaturely), man has in relation to God a relatively independent principle in himself; but because precisely this principle - without it ceasing for that reason to be dark in accordance with its ground - is transfigured in light, there arises in him something higher, spirit." Ibid., pg. 32.

[29] "[I]f God as spirit is the inseverable unity of both principles [light and dark, existence and ground], and this same unity is only real in the spirit of man, then, if the principles were just as indissoluble in him [man] as in God, man would not be distinguishable from God at all; he would disappear in God, and there would be no revelation and motility of love." Ibid., pg. 41.

[30] Plato, Timaeus. Pg. 57.