On remerciera ainsi vivement Jacques Bouveresse pour cette contribution, sinon définitive, du moins décisive à la dite « affaire Sokal ». Jusqu'alors, les réponses faites au livre de Sokal et Bricmont (Impostures intellectuelles, 1999), recencés par l'auteur, avançaient « un droit à la métaphore » et, plus largement, « une liberté de pensée » : autant d'arguments contrecarrant ainsi dans l'œuf toutes tentatives de rectification épistémique.

L'usage de savoirs mathématiques ou de physique théorique en philosophie semblait ne devoir être soumis à aucune critique, le décalage entre la nature même du savoir importé et son emploi n'étant alors nullement perçu comme un motif valable et suffisant de mise en doute de la pensée ainsi exprimée.

Il ne s'agit guère ici pour l'auteur d'invalider telle ou telle conception au non d'une théorie de l'analogie dont il spécifie qu'elle n'existe pas (p.34) et moins encore de défendre telle ou telle vue normative sur la philosophie des sciences (p.12) mais d'une part, de discuter l'usage de l'analogie comme d'un procédé démonstratif sujet à abus. Il faut, suggère-t-il habilement, distinguer « l'analogie suggestive » de « l'analogie démonstrative » (p. 27). Et d'autre part, de répondre à ces abus des belles-lettres qui jouent de l'incompréhension et des raisonnements à l'emporte-pièce comme d'une marque de style et un label de valeur intellectuelle.

Et de rajouter qu'il faut comprendre que l'on puisse « se sentir offensé par l'accumulation des assertions sans preuve, les confusions grossières, les fautes contre la logique, les raisonnements absurdes, [...] et de l'être doublement, lorsque ceux qui se le permettent réussissent en même temps à rendre à peu près impossible ou incompréhensible la protestation que l'on pourrait avoir envie de faire entendre » (p.19).

Si la lecture de cet ouvrage stimule la réflexion quant à la rigueur des procédés démonstratifs utilisés par le tout avenant scientifique, il n'en reste pas moins qu'à la fois son court format et sa dimension polémique tendent, il nous semble, à oblitérer deux questions fondamentales :

a/ Quels sont en dernier recours la fin de toutes ces métaphores, de ces analogies erronées ou non, de ces critiques épistémiques et de ses réponses aux contre-attaques ? Bouveresse n'aborde assez étrangement à aucun moment cette question ; et même si par ailleurs il renvoie épisodiquement à la relation entre philosophie et réel, cela ne reste qu'une référence sommaire et indirecte. Sans un accord sur la téléologie du discours savant ou intellectuel, on ne peut à l'évidence se mettre d'accord sur les critères de validité et de légitimité de ces derniers ; sans référents communs point de discussions constructives...

b/ La deuxième question s'infère en partie de la première. Ne mettant pas en doute l'erreur dénoncée par Bouveresse à l'endroit de Debray et de ses homologues, nous pouvons tout de même questionner, en toute relativité quasi-feyerabendienne, ce nécessaire primat du raisonnement "scientifiquement conforme" sur l'efficacité émotionnelle : au nom de quelle valeur méta-argumentative la raison devrait-elle se trouver du côté de la justesse épistémologique ? Après tout, la vérité sur le monde n'est pas dictée par la science. Même si par ailleurs celle-ci y contribue indubitablement, elle ne peut contrôler l'usage qui est fait de ses concepts et, par voie de conséquence, nous croyons à l'ADN ou à l'organisation subatomique de la matière sans vraiment savoir comment cela fonctionne précisément. Et si nous ne remettons pas en question la nécessité d'une rigueur épistémique comme d'un instrument du « capital de conscience et de réflexion critico-méthodologique » (Schwartz, 1993, p. 265) de chaque science, il serait sûrement très intéressant de sonder cette tendance logocentrique dans sa nature, sa genèse, et dans les résistances qu'elle rencontre.

Compte rendu de : Jacques Bouveresse, Prodiges et vertiges de l'analogie - De l'abus des belles-lettres dans la pensée, Liber-Raisons d'agir, 2000, 155 p.

[Vous retrouverez l'intégralite de ce compte rendu à cette adresse]

The main aspect of deconstructing post-Freudian string theory in terms of pseudo-altruistic Marxism is perhaps the democratising impact of illusionary radical-Cartesian neurology on the clinical wavelengths of the ego and super-ego, together with the concept of the geographically deterministic philosophy of oppressive hyper-poststructuralist calibration. However, post-Modernist, and indeed neo-xenophobic empiricism must be taken into account.
Affirming the presence of quantum absolutism in regular sub-misogynistic Socratic apparatuses, one must extensively undermine intrinsically discombobulating Lacanian cryogenic formulae. Yet it may catastrophically seem to the evolutionary post-colonial caricaturist that intelligent, or even figurative ichthyology cannot be attracted to pre-Palaeolithic Romantic patriotism.
In order that one be able to command the hyper-linguistic gravitational Darwinist criticisms of surrealist matrimonial experiment, it is repeatedly necessary that neo-idealist transformation and to a lesser extent pre-feminist existentialist dynamics be formulaically distressed. The interconnectedness of epistemological paraphernalia can thereby be socio-economically linked to neo-pre-Historicism, and in effect chromatographic-Descartes psychoanalysis of the gastroenterological consequences of post-symbolic approbatory colloquialism of faux-abstract and subjunctive relativity. In essence, what is inherent in schematic industrialist androgyny is the hyper-naturalistic corroboration of Pascal’s ostensibly institutionalised space-time, evident in his ‘pluperfect-progressive phallic probability’ theorem.
There is also the fatalistic issue of the neo-Capitalist gravimetric totalitarianism in conjunction with necrophilic portmanteaux evident in the Platonic ‘traditional-revolutionary chimera’ tautology. Thus, what we ultimately receive is a utilitarian-colorimetric tegestology constituency, verging on absurdism.

Sources

Sokal, Alan, Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity

But you knew that already.

For one, you have Alan Sokal, an objective physicist who wrote a long paper which he purposefully filled with nonsense and gibberish pertaining to popular post-modern stuff. He sent the paper to a prominent peer-reviewed journal and they accepted it and it ran unquestioned for a year before Sokal publicly announced that his paper was garbage. I read the actual paper and Sokal cites several prominent relativist thinkers like Luce Iragaray, Derrida, and Lacan. Because of this name dropping the paper also servers to call out certain thinkers whom Sokal believes have no grounding in reality. Now, I’ve read some Iragaray and boy is she a pain in the ass. She’s a sort of feminist philosopher who uses language in ways that unhinge our understanding of the subject. For example: she famously called E=mc2 “a sexed equation” basically claiming that this fundamental component of physics is a part of a sexist, male dominated world. Sounds retarded, doesn’t it? The thing is, she is being problematic on purpose. She believes that the world of science is largely dominated by men and is therefore using their language to make a feminist point. The statement isn’t true but it points to things that might be true. I don’t like her. I would call her an artist and not a philosopher because she doesn’t work to make a sensible and strong rhetorical argument. She writes sensationalist hyperboles and intentionally untrue statements that can be interpreted a number of ways.

This is all just a long winded way of trying to explain a little bit of the feuding that goes on in the liberal world. I bring this topic up because of a few recent events on my campus that represent bigger issues.

First, on Valentine ’s Day, a school club called The Anti-Racist Collective put up signs all over campus that, from a distance, looked like regular handmade construction paper & paste valentines. On close inspection they said things like, “This institution was founded on racism” and other bits of rhetoric having to do with what this movement calls ‘white privilege.’ Of course, Hampshire wasn’t founded on racism. It’s not like a bunch of stupid yokels in white gowns and hoods built this college with their bare hands. I have come to learn some things about the politics of race/class issues and this kind of collective represents a part of liberalism and I don’t completely agree with. I understand the need to be very conscious of race issues but this kind of collective makes a habit of intentional hostility and aggravated actions carried out in order to draw attention to itself. A while ago, the same collective stated that white people were in the wrong for appropriating things like the Mohawk and dreadlocks, as they believe those hairstyles belong to certain cultures and that white people continue their tradition of colonization by ‘stealing’ culture. But culture is germinal; it makes itself by growing, barrowing, and eating away at surrounding cultures. This Hampshire group probably doesn’t think it can stem the tide appropriation and they can’t, and it would be silly to believe anyone could. The group set up a station where students could chop off their hair in public.

This kind of political maneuver disturbs me on some deep level. It hints at the ability that liberals have to believe they are being righteous while they play at a sort of social engineering. They fight propaganda with propaganda (think those TRUTH anti-smoking ads). A group of feminists, here at Hampshire, are advocating for the expulsion of a students who made an immature but harmless Facebook group that was made as a (poor) ironic joke. I can see how someone could be upset by it, but why advocate for his expulsion? Wouldn’t that be unconstitutional and illegal? Wouldn’t his expulsion greatly damage his reputation, career, and life?

Many liberal movements strive for peace and to give all people a fair shot at life. The problem is, they all get so caught up in their individual agendas that they fail to see how they are hurting those in their blind spots; they fail to see their hypocrisy.

Many of these groups want to work for social change, and to give power and security to the working class and to minorities. Their focus often lies in places like New Orleans, Jena Louisiana, Palestine/Israel, Darfur, China, and other places that face gross human rights violations, disease, racism, and natural disasters, and war. Of course, we should be thinking about those places but I wonder if it is best for us to enter ourselves into those conflicts if we are outside of them. Socially active youngsters sometimes think of themselves as international zookeepers that are capable of inflicting change, but I am skeptical.

One example of hypocrisy glared at me recently. I was talking with some friends who are native to Massachusetts and they explained that the townies of Western Massachusetts have been known to be violent toward students of the local colleges, and that there is a general loathing of the kids who are entitled enough to be at these 5 institutions that dominate the area. When you think about it, it becomes a very thick problem. Without these colleges, Western Massachusetts would not have been developed as it is now but on the other hand, the colleges drive up real estate prices, inflate the economy, makes life very difficult for its rural inhabitants, and has forced academic culture on the landscape.

Do we have the right to tell people to not harm culture if we, by the virtue of living where we do, harm culture?

It doesn't bother me. I understand that the world isn't a zoo. We don't have the benefit of quarantine and everyone has to exist in a world where humans trespass upon each other, sometimes much more violently than others.

The Relevance of Husserl’s Account of
Lived Experience to Natural Science

Husserl, working from the idea that reality is always “reality as experienced”, wishes to argue that there should be no rift between natural science and lived experience. Therefore, according to Husserl, “scientists cannot isolate hypotheses from the experience of previous scientists, from technologies developed through the science of the day, or from the instruments and theories that make up the matrix of available investigative methods.” (288) The scientist, as an erring human, cannot offer an accurate truly objective observation. Like any other discipline, scientists have personal agendas from which they operate, and are there to serve the interests of certain institutions: “no scientific inquiry is ever stable in the sense of identifying measurements or methods that would supersede the life-world or offer truths above it.” (289) The connection that scientific intent has to its practical implications/applications in ‘reality’ must always remain intact. McGee uses cloning as an example where issues of politics, identity, freedom, and religion precede the investigation itself: “it is the history of science that actually renders the concept of objective inquiry more intelligible.” (291) To bypass the issue of ‘truth’ in the sciences, Husserl exchanges this term with ‘truth-value’, which implies that the result of a scientific investigation is only valid insofar as its correspondence with/ perceived application to lived experience.

Dewey’s Account of Science, Culture, and Value

Dewey looks at the evolution of science chronologically, noting a shift in its “purposes of inquiry”, which mediates its access to objects in nature: “The instrumental objects of science are completely themselves only as they direct the changes of nature toward a fulfilling object. Science changes nature and thus the context for inquiry” (292). Dewey also argued that science acts only as a “human response to need”, (293) and, like Husserl, that scientific inquiry is rarely made without a purpose (or [social] irritant to inspire it.) This is where McGee takes issue with the likes of Sokal, believing that he is “naïve” to the inherently controlled nature of scientific methods. For Dewey, (like Husserl), “all science is applied science”, and McGee believes Sokal’s allegations are still entrenched in the overzealous ideals of “ancient science.” (294) Dewey does not believe in a separation between ethics and science, but rather insists that ethics must constantly inform scientific methods and that science is obligated to play a part in “solving human problems.” (295) McGee uses the abortion debate as an example in which arguments are derived from universals outside of human experience (although that claim in itself is pretty debatable.) In the same way that Husserl insists the humanities must inform the sciences, Dewey encourages the inclusion of science in human (all) issues: “Where will regulation of values come from if we surrender familiar and traditionally prized values as our directive standards? Very largely from the findings of the natural sciences.” (295)

Dewey’s and Husserl’s Common Faith in Practical Wisdom

McGee concludes that Dewey and Husserl agree that “inquiry begins and is limited by the problems of the life-world” and are each critical of the notion of a ‘pure’ or ‘purposeless’ science, or one that is capable of attaining a Truth “outside experience.” (296). However, McGee argues that they do not fall under the category of the ‘postmodernists’ Sokal targets, because Husserl and Dewey both accredit science as being more than ‘just another narrative’ and often result (with interdisciplinary guidance) in solving some of society’s most pressing issues. Despite the different intentions of each philosopher, they both “react against a tradition that deemphasizes everyday living or the role of the humanities in measuring and shaping inquiry.” (297)

McGee, Glenn, "Dewey and Husserl on Natural Science and Values: Learning from the Sokal Debate." The Journal of Speculative Philosophy. Vol. 14, Issue 4, 2001. pp 14.

Why did I do it? While my method was satirical, my motivation is utterly serious. What concerns me is the proliferation, not just of nonsense and sloppy thinking per se, but of a particular kind of nonsense and sloppy thinking: one that denies the existence of objective realities, or (when challenged) admits their existence but downplays their practical relevance. At its best, a journal like Social Text raises important questions that no scientist should ignore -- questions, for example, about how corporate and government funding influence scientific work. Unfortunately, epistemic relativism does little to further the discussion of these matters.

In short, my concern over the spread of subjectivist thinking is both intellectual and political. Intellectually, the problem with such doctrines is that they are false (when not simply meaningless). There is a real world; its properties are not merely social constructions; facts and evidence do matter. What sane person would contend otherwise? And yet, much contemporary academic theorizing consists precisely of attempts to blur these obvious truths -- the utter absurdity of it all being concealed through obscure and pretentious language.

One nice thing about scientists is that when they do approach disciplines like the law and humanities, their rigor and concern for real understanding often carries over. Folks that talk about "postmodern gender hegemonic hermeneutics" don't know the difference between mere words and understanding. They simply cover up their own contorted thinking with a thicket of impressive-sounding, though utterly imprecise, vocabulary. The quicker the world of humanities learns that "inventing a term" is not the same as actually discovering a law of nature or saying something useful and interesting about the human condition, the better off we will all be.